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 Introduction
A. Introduction The SCSG was open to the faculty and students of 
Indiana University (Indianapolis and Bloomington 
campuses) and, by extension, to others in the 
Indianapolis community.  While this was meant 
to be inclusive rather than exclusive, we did not 
exhaustively recruit participants from outside the 
IU/IUPUI community, since facility space was 
limited.  Email invitations were sent to related 
university departments but most participants 
from both inside and outside Indiana University 
reported that they had learned about the SCSG by 
word of mouth. Beyond this semi-structured 
recruitment effort, members of the group self-
selected.  There were no prerequisites for 
participation.  On average, each meeting drew 
between fifteen and twenty participants, 
representing a diversity of fields.  Regular 
attendees included medical, nursing and allied 
health professionals; individuals with legal and 
legislative experience; faculty from the schools of 
medicine, nursing and liberal arts; representatives 
of ethics services at local hospitals; and business 
professionals.  While few members of the group 
had formal educational background in bioethics 
(e.g., advanced academic degrees), many had 
encountered such issues in their professional 
training or careers.  Attendance was not 
mandatory, and we did not close the group to 
new participants at any time.  We did have 
members join and leave at various points, but 
there was a core group of ten to fifteen 
participants who attended consistently for the 
duration of the study group.  Many but not all of 
these participants are co-authors on this paper. 
 
Since the initial isolation of human embryonic 
stem cells in 1998 (Thomson et al. 1998), 
important developments in research have offered 
the promise of valuable therapeutic 
breakthroughs while continuing to raise 
significant social, ethical, legal and policy 
challenges.  Among the interests of the Indiana 
University Center for Bioethics (IUCB) is a desire 
to engage issues of this kind, and in so doing, to 
provide a resource to the IU community, to 
Indiana, and to the entire country.  The topic of 
stem cell research was, therefore, an appropriate 
one for discussion at the Center.  In January 
2002, the IUCB created a Stem Cell Study Group 
(SCSG).  Our primary goal was to provide a 
forum for informed public discussion of the issues 
by making use of the considerable local scientific, 
legal and ethical expertise.  In other words, we 
wanted primarily to educate ourselves about 
these issues.  Our secondary goal was to identify 
and describe those points on which agreement 
could be achieved, as well as those issues on 
which agreement proved difficult if not 
impossible.  This paper summarizes our efforts to 
meet both of these goals.   
 
A.1. Methods of study 
 
Study groups have been used on several occasions 
for engaging members of a community on topics 
related to bioethics.  For example, study groups 
have been used to discuss single topics, such as 
advance directives (Singer et al. 1992) and 
research involving human subjects (Moreno et al. 
1998).  They have also been used for long-term 
collaboration on multiple topics (University of 
Illinois at Chicago Research Ethics Study Group 
2002).  Given considerable public commentary 
on the ethics, science and law related to human 
stem cell research, the IUCB concluded that a 
study group on these issues would be an effective 
way to raise awareness and understanding of this 
area of research. 
 
The SCSG met on a regular basis (approximately 
biweekly) at the IUCB from January until June 
2002.  Fifteen meetings were held, with each 
lasting between one and one-and-a-half hours.  
Six of the meetings were didactic sessions, at 
which an expert made a formal presentation for 
the first hour, followed by thirty minutes of 
discussion to clarify points. These six meetings 
covered the following topics:  the science of stem 
cells; clinical applications; legal issues; ethical and 
policy issues; theological perspectives; and the 
distinction between the public and private sectors 
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B. The Science of Human Stem Cells (see Appendix A).  A reading list was distributed 
for each of these sessions, and modest 
background reading was expected (see Appendix 
B).  Nine meetings were devoted exclusively to 
group discussion without a formal presentation.  
At some meetings additional handouts were 
provided (e.g., covering recent news stories).  
Notes were taken at each meeting, including 
those at which formal presentations were made, 
to ensure that an accurate record of the 
discussion was maintained.  The IUCB website 
(www.bioethics.iu.edu) listed the study group’s 
objectives and schedule as well as related web 
resources.  A moderated email distribution list 
provided an efficient means for dissemination of 
study group news and information, as well as a 
forum for discussion among group members. 
 
The Stem Cell Study Group heard presentations 
by two scientists at the Indiana University School 
of Medicine who have distinguished themselves in 
this area of research.  The first speaker, who 
researches the property of plasticity in adult stem 
cells in mice, gave a summary presentation of the 
definition and properties of stem cells and how 
they are derived.  The second, a pioneer in the 
field of umbilical cord blood transplantation, 
spoke about the current state of the research on 
embryonic and adult stem cells, including both 
advances and obstacles.  He also described how 
certain existing therapies already make use of the 
peculiar capacities of stem cells, e.g. bone 
marrow and umbilical cord blood 
transplantation.  This paper does not provide an 
exhaustive account of either presentation.  
Instead, we aspire only to provide an 
understanding of the fundamental science of stem 
cells: what they are, why they are important, and 
how they can be obtained. 
 
A.2. Purpose of the paper 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an 
accurate summary of the discussions and 
outcomes of the Stem Cell Study Group.  In so 
doing, we intend to fairly represent the scientific, 
ethical, theological and legal analyses provided by 
our expert speakers as well as the richness and 
scope of the discussions. Not surprisingly, there 
was disagreement about many of these issues.  In 
this sense we were no different from other 
committees and groups that have tackled issues 
such as cloning or stem cell research (NBAC 
1997, 1999b; PCB 2002).  Nevertheless, our 
efforts were far from fruitless, since they 
undoubtedly enhanced awareness of various 
thoughtful perspectives on human stem cell 
research.   As education was one of the central 
objectives of the group, we intend for this paper 
to be useful to others who are seeking to 
understand the scientific, social and ethical 
implications of human stem cell research.  This 
paper is set up in five sections:  The Science of 
Human Stem Cells; Selected Ethical Issues; 
Theology and Stem Cell Research; Law and 
Policy Related to Stem Cell Research; and 
Conclusions. 
 
B.1. What are “stem cells”? 
 
Stem cells are cells that display the abilities (1) to 
self-renew (i.e., to divide and give rise to other 
stem cells) and (2) to produce offspring that 
develop each of the specialized functions of the 
body (e.g., blood cells, brain cells, heart cells, 
kidney cells, etc.) (NIH 2001, ES-2).  In 
vertebrates, stem cells have classically been 
divided into two groups: embryonic stem cells and 
somatic or adult stem cells. 
 
The fertilized oocyte (egg) is the “mother” of all 
stem cells.  This single cell (the zygote) has the 
potential to form all the cells and tissues of both 
the embryo and the placenta, and it is therefore 
described as totipotent.  After several rounds of 
cell division, at approximately the 64-cell stage, 
the cells form a structure called the blastocyst.  
One pole of the blastocyst consists of cells that 
will ultimately differentiate to form the placenta.  
The opposite portion contains the inner cell mass, 
which will go on to form the embryo itself.  Cells 
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within the inner cell mass of the blastocyst are 
pluripotent.  That is, each cell possesses the 
potential to give rise to all of the different kinds 
of cells in the human body.  These pluripotent 
cells are referred to as embryonic stem (ES) cells 
upon growth in tissue culture conditions.  
B.3. How can “stem cells” be obtained? 
 
There are a number of sources for obtaining and 
isolating stem cells, each of which raises 
important ethical and policy concerns.  The four 
most common sources include: aborted fetal 
tissue; embryos that remain after in vitro 
fertilization treatments; specially created 
“research-purpose” embryos; and mature (or 
“adult”) somatic cells.   
 
B.2.   Why are “stem cells” important? 
 
Because of their pluripotency and renewability, 
ES cells are believed to hold considerable promise 
for medical therapy particularly in the field of 
regenerative medicine.  Since the first successful 
isolation of human ES cells in 1998, ES cells have 
proven to retain their self-renewal capacities in 
vitro.  A single line of ES cells can be propagated 
for years, through several hundred cycles of 
replication, without compromising its genetic 
composition (IOM 2002, 32).  Because of this 
remarkable proliferative capacity, a single healthy 
“line” of stem cells can provide a wealth of cells 
for use in research and/or transplantation.  These 
properties also make the study of ES cells 
important for understanding early human 
development, especially the effects of cell 
mutations or chromosomal abnormalities on early 
embryonic development (NIH 2001, 17). 
 
B.3.a. Embryonic germ (EG) cells from aborted fetal 
tissue 
 
Of the two landmark scientific announcements 
related to stem cell research in 1998, one 
involved the extraction of embryonic germ (EG) cells 
from the gonadal ridge (the portion of a fetus that 
would develop into testes or ovaries) of a fetus 
following an elective abortion (Shamblott 1998).  
EG cells share many of the distinctive properties 
of ES cells, including the capacity for long-term 
self-renewal in vitro and the ability to give rise to 
multiple cell types of the human body (NIH 
2001, 14).  Federal and state legislation already 
permit the use of fetal tissue in transplantation 
research, so long as there are safeguards in place 
to ensure that the decision to terminate the 
pregnancy is separate from the decision to donate 
tissue for use in research (See Section E.1.a. 
below). 
 
Moreover, since cultured ES cells are as yet 
undifferentiated, they retain the potential to 
develop into any kind of cell in the human body.  
Though research into specific differentiation 
pathways for human ES cells is still in its 
beginning stages, scientists have successfully 
induced mouse ES cells to develop ex vivo into the 
cells of various individual organ systems, 
including the brain and nervous system, the 
pancreas and the hematopoietic system (IOM 
2002, 32).   Moreover, if researchers can learn 
how to similarly “direct” human ES cells to 
differentiate into specific tissues, healthy cells 
from a single ES cell line may someday be used to 
repair damaged or defective tissue in patients 
with Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes and spinal cord 
injuries, among many other debilitating 
conditions (IOM 2002, 8). 
   
B.3.b. Embryonic stem (ES) cells from embryos that 
are in excess of clinical need for infertility 
treatments 
 
Couples who utilize in vitro fertilization typically 
produce many embryos for possible repeat 
attempts. While there is variation among 
individual infertility centers in the number of 
eggs obtained, the number of eggs fertilized, and 
the number of embryos implanted, it is common 
for embryos to remain in excess of clinical need 
(New York State Task Force on Life and the Law 
1998, 398-402).  In the majority of centers, 
couples are given several options for the 
disposition of embryos that may remain after they 
3 
The Science of Human Stem Cells  
discontinue their efforts to get pregnant:  they 
may donate the embryos to another couple for 
their own reproductive efforts, they may direct 
that the embryos be discarded, or they may 
donate the embryos for use in scientific research.  
In most cases, couples choose one of the latter 
options.  In theory, then, no embryo may be used 
in research without express informed consent for 
this use (usually of the donor couple). Frozen 
embryos that are donated for use in research can 
be thawed and allowed to continue developing to 
the blastocyst stage, at which point the stem cells 
can be removed from the inner cell mass.  This 
procedure results in the destruction of the 
embryo.   
 
B.3.c. ES cells from embryos created for research 
purposes 
 
While stem cells from existing embryos and 
aborted fetal tissue are useful, some scientists 
have argued that it would be of even greater 
value for researchers to create embryos 
specifically for research purposes.  The creation 
of research-purpose embryos would ensure an 
adequate supply of embryos for research and 
treatment purposes, and it would also allow for 
maximum control over the genetic properties of 
the resulting stem cells, which is particularly 
important for transplantation and regenerative 
medicine.   
 
In the past, embryos have been created for 
research by in vitro fertilization techniques, but 
recent discussion has been dominated by the 
prospect of using “somatic cell nuclear transfer” 
(SCNT or “cloning”) as a means of creating 
embryos for stem cell research.  In nuclear 
transfer, an oocyte’s nucleus is removed, and a 
nucleus from a somatic cell is inserted into the 
enucleated oocyte.  With the new nucleus, the 
egg has the full complement of chromosomes of a 
cell instead of the half complement that an oocyte 
usually contains.  Thus, a sperm is not needed to 
contribute a second half complement of 
chromosomes, and the oocyte can be stimulated 
to become an embryo.  The created embryo is 
then grown to the blastocyst stage, at which point 
the pluripotent cells can be extracted from the 
inner cell mass.  The resulting stem cells are 
genetic clones of the cell from which the nucleus 
was obtained. 
 
Some scientists have postulated that application of 
this technique could be revolutionary to human 
therapeutic organ repair, since it could provide a 
perfectly matched donor for every patient (Lanza 
et al. 2000, 3176).  If a patient needs a kidney, 
for example, scientists may someday be able to 
direct ES cells cloned from that patient’s own 
somatic cells to differentiate into kidney cells, 
creating a new organ that is an exact genetic 
match to the patient and therefore poses no risk 
of immunologic rejection.  More imminent than 
the creation of whole organs is the possibility of 
using stem cells with the patient’s own genetic 
code to regenerate damaged tissues (such as 
nerve tissue damaged by Parkinson’s disease) or 
to match tissue for autologous cell replacement 
therapies.  These applications fall into the 
category of treatments that have lately been 
labeled “therapeutic cloning.”  While promising, 
there are still many scientific issues to be 
addressed before the use of therapeutic cloning 
for the treatment of disease can be considered a 
realistic possibility (Lanza et al. 2000, 3175).  
 
B.3.d.  Adult stem cells  
 
In adult human beings cell division is constantly 
underway, providing the body with renewable 
sources of cells that naturally die.  The 
replacements for the body’s cells come from 
relatively undifferentiated cells that are 
programmed to generate specific types of cells.  
These adult or somatic stem cells (AS cells) are 
multipotent cells—like embryonic stem cells, they 
have the ability to self-renew, but their progeny 
can give rise not to all the different types of cells 
that comprise the human body, but to all the 
different types of cells that comprise a particular 
tissue or organ (e.g., all of the cells of the blood, 
heart, liver or brain) (Blau et al. 2001).  The 
principal sources of somatic stem cells include 
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C.  Selected Ethical Issues  bone marrow, cornea, retina, brain, skeletal 
muscle, dental pulp, skin, pancreas, liver, and the 
lining of the intestine. 
  
It is not surprising that ES cell research raises 
challenging questions, given that it touches on 
ethics, religion, culture, and fundamental social 
practices.  Certain important ethical questions are 
raised by any new resource-intensive technology.   
For example, what weight should the  
government and its regulatory structure give to 
new, expensive technologies relative to other 
important social priorities, such as the provision 
of basic health care?  How should society direct 
communal resources toward those therapies that 
promise benefit for all members of society?  How 
should society support the use of a particular 
technology for valuable therapeutic purposes but 
restrict its use for less acceptable ends?  How 
should such distinctions to be made? 
 
The hematopoietic stem cell is probably the best-
characterized stem cell in the human body.  
These cells divide slowly in the bone marrow and 
replenish themselves throughout life.  Every 
hour, 10 billion red blood cells and 100 million 
white blood cells are produced in the marrow 
from hematopoietic stem cells and are released 
into our circulating blood.  Sources of 
hematopoietic stem cells already in use for 
transplantation to treat a number of malignant 
and non-malignant diseases are:  bone marrow, 
growth factor mobilized-peripheral blood, and 
umbilical cord blood (NIH 2001, 46). 
 
There has long been considerable interest in the 
concept of adult stem cell plasticity—the capacity 
of a cell to generate cells of a completely 
different organ upon transplantation (Orkin 
2000, 1212).  Recall that adult stem cells are 
specific to one organ or another.  There are heart 
adult stem cells, brain adult stem cells, blood 
adult stem cells, etc.  However, it may be that 
adult stem cells of one organ type have the ability 
to give rise to cells of another organ.  A number 
of studies have reported that adult stem cells 
possess such plasticity.  Bone marrow cells have 
been demonstrated to give rise to muscle cells, 
brain stem cells have contributed to blood and 
muscle, and so on (Howell et al. 2002; Jiang et 
al. 2002). 
 
Another set of important ethical and policy issues 
is specific to scientific research on human tissues 
generally, most notably the issue of informed 
consent.  What kind of informed consent should 
be sought for ES cell research, and from whom? 
How should the risks and potential benefits be 
described? Additional issues relate to the 
treatment afforded and respect given to the body 
and its parts, to the products of conception, and 
to life itself (NBAC 1999a).  
 
Many studies and thoughtful analyses have 
discussed these issues in considerable detail 
(AAAS/ICS 1999; AJOB 2002; IOM 2002; 
NBAC 1999b, 2000; NIH 2001; NCB 2001; PCB 
2002).  Although each was undertaken at a 
particular time, with access only to the current 
scientific knowledge, similar ethical issues arose 
in every instance.  Our experience was no 
different.  We take this to mean that in an area of 
technology such as this, there are a number of 
enduring ethical issues that transcend the science. 
 
However, whether or not adult stem cells truly 
possess plasticity is still far from certain.  
Scientists have shown that adult stem cells from 
one organ can take on the appearance of cells from 
another organ, but they have yet to definitively 
prove that the transformed cells have also 
assumed the function of the new organ (Holden 
and Vogel 2002).  Much research remains to be 
done to prove that adult stem cells have the type 
and extent of plasticity found in ES cells.   
 
The issues that proved to be central to our 
discussion were those arising from the nature of 
the various sources of ES and EG cells:  what 
ethical concerns do the sources raise, and to what 
extent ought society to limit, permit or facilitate 
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the various methods to obtain these cells?  Since 
the purpose of this paper is to accurately 
represent the context and content of our SCSG 
discussions, we will focus on these questions. 
 
C.1. EG cells from fetal tissue following abortions 
(cadaveric fetal tissue) 
 
The use of fetal tissue following abortion raises 
issues that warrant public scrutiny irrespective of 
whether one finds abortion to be morally 
objectionable or permissible.  Like others who 
have commented on this issue, we heard different 
points of view regarding the association of 
research using EG cells obtained from cadaveric 
fetal tissues with abortion.  Though a direct causal 
relationship is difficult to demonstrate 
empirically—i.e., that the prospect of donating 
fetal tissue for EG cell research would cause 
women to have abortions who otherwise would 
not—safeguards already exist in federal fetal 
tissue transplantation regulation (see section 
E.1.a. below) to reduce the risk that a woman’s 
decision to abort would be inappropriately 
influenced by the possibility of donating fetal 
tissue for transplantation.  A more general, but 
nevertheless more difficult, concern is the 
symbolic association some perceive between the 
use of cadaveric fetal tissue and the abortion 
itself.  On this view, benefiting from the product 
of a moral wrong may be conceived as 
legitimizing the original wrongdoing.     
 
Members of the SCSG voiced broad approval for 
the use of cadaveric fetal tissue as a source of 
embryonic germ cells.  While a few members did 
object to any practice that may increase the 
incidence of abortion or enhance its social 
acceptance, it was nevertheless agreed that the 
collection of EG cells from an already-deceased 
fetus is, in itself, less ethically problematic than 
the deliberate destruction of an embryo for the 
same purpose, provided the possibility of 
donating tissue in no way encouraged the decision 
to abort.  Nonetheless, even among those who 
supported the use of aborted fetal tissue, it was 
believed that existing procedural safeguards 
separating the decision to abort and the decision 
to donate; prohibiting incentives for the donation 
of fetal tissue; and prohibiting directed donation 
ought to be strictly enforced.   
 
Consent for the donation of fetal tissue proved to 
be more problematic.  We considered the 
scenario to be more analogous to the donation of 
a deceased family member’s tissues or organs, 
than to a case of third-party “consent” in the 
traditional medical research model, since there is 
no living individual who could be considered a 
“subject” of the research.  And yet there remained 
some disagreement about who has the right to 
consent to that donation.  Some SCSG members 
identified strongly with the position held by 
Burtchaell that a mother who decides to abort her 
child abdicates her parental responsibilities and 
therefore forfeits her parental right to determine 
the disposition of the dead fetus (Burtchaell 1988, 
8).  However, many others believed that the 
decision to donate fetal tissue should be the 
mother’s, since our society recognizes the 
authority of family members to donate a 
decedent’s organs for transplantation, even if the 
same family members authorized the withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment.   
 
C.2. ES cells from human embryos 
 
The potential for therapeutic benefits arising 
from ES cell research constitutes a powerful case 
for supporting this area of scientific endeavor.  
Yet, even if society supports ES cell research in 
principle, important ethical issues about the use 
of embryos as a source for ES cells must be 
addressed before this support can translate into 
practice.  For example, it is well known that a 
coherent regulatory scheme does not exist for 
infertility clinics in the U.S. (New York State 
Task Force on Life and the Law 1998, 407-417), 
making it difficult to establish common standards 
for obtaining, storing, freezing, donating and 
discarding embryos, and for making them 
available for research.  This regulatory vacuum 
raises questions about how this particular source 
of embryos can be adequately monitored.  These 
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concerns are already in need of considerable 
attention from ethicists and policy-makers, and 
they are only becoming more crucial as science 
continually makes strides in stem cell research.   
 
Prior to questions of regulation and protocol, 
however, even more profound moral issues must 
be addressed, and it was on these fundamental 
ethical concerns that the SCSG focused.  Chief 
among these concerns is that the isolation of 
embryonic stem cells for use in research requires 
the destruction of an embryo in the blastocyst 
phase of development.  The permissibility of ES 
cell research thus depends upon the permissibility 
of destroying an embryo, and much of the debate 
surrounding the issue derives from the question:  
how should the human embryo be treated?  Like 
other groups, the SCSG did not come to 
unanimous agreement on this issue.  However, 
we did make considerable progress towards 
understanding the complexities of the various 
positions and developing a common 
understanding of what is at stake in making policy 
decisions of this kind.  
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To say that something “has moral status” is to say 
something about how one should act toward that 
thing or person and what that thing or person 
may expect from others (NBAC 1999b, 49).  
Thus, to take a position on the moral status of 
embryo is to make an argument about how it 
ought to be treated—by its parents, by 
researchers, and by society as a whole.  So it is 
not surprising that views diverge widely, ranging 
from those who believe that the embryo has “full” 
moral status (that is, equivalent to an adult 
human) to those who believe that the embryo has 
no greater moral status than a cluster of cells, 
with various intermediate positions between. 
Each of these views has very different 
implications for public policy.  For example, if 
those who hold the “full moral status” position 
believe that beings with this status cannot be 
destroyed under any circumstance, then they 
cannot support ES cell research.  The potential 
benefits to others should be knowingly foregone 
in favor of the protection of the embryo.  A 
“developmental” view, such as that adopted by 
NBAC, holds that the embryo deserves “respect” 
as a form of human life, and that the moral status 
of the embryo increases in relation to its 
developing state (NBAC 1999b, 50).  While this 
view attempts to provide the basis for both 
permitting ES cell research and demonstrating 
respect, it does not establish when it would be 
permissible to destroy the embryo and at what 
point in its development it would become 
impermissible. 
 
The issue of the treatment of the embryo is 
rooted in beliefs about the beginning of life and 
the nature of human personhood.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that the SCSG did not come to 
unanimous agreement on the issue.  Answers to 
such fundamental questions are often based on 
metaphysical or theological presuppositions that 
are essentially unverifiable and, as such, 
incommensurable.  To some members of the 
group, this issue seemed to be an example of 
what Alasdair MacIntyre calls an “interminable 
debate” (MacIntyre 1981, 6).  Recognizing the 
pitfalls of the conventional rhetoric, we struggled 
for alternative ways of considering the issue. 
 
One way that we made progress was by 
considering the following thought experiment:  
Would we treat pregnancy differently if we 
considered the products of conception to have 
full moral status as human persons?  How could 
society endeavor to provide the same degree of 
protection for embryos as it provides for infants 
and small children?  Would we require pregnant 
women to refrain from consuming alcohol, 
cigarette smoking, or engaging in risky diets?  
Would we impose criminal penalties upon those 
who violated these mandates, as we do for those 
parents who fail to use car seats or who otherwise 
neglect their children?  Would we require them 
to take affirmative steps to ensure the health of 
the developing baby by taking vitamin 
supplements and consuming at least five servings 
of fruits and vegetables per day?  Moreover, 
considering that at least 50% of conceptions 
result in miscarriage before the woman even 
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knows she is pregnant, would we require these 
measures of all women of childbearing age and 
capacity, just in case they are pregnant?   
 
This hypothetical proved a provocative tool for 
discussion, as it compelled group members to 
take the issue of “moral status” out of the abstract 
and to consider its real implications.  Many 
members of the SCSG believed that to answer 
affirmatively to any of the above questions would 
impose unreasonable sacrifices and restrictions on 
the women who are carrying those embryos.  We 
could not require women to take as extensive 
measures to care for embryos as we require them 
to take for their children, and it seems equally 
ludicrous to expect people to treat every early 
spontaneous abortion—many of which go 
undetected—as if it were equivalent to the death 
of a fully-grown child.  In short, to treat the 
embryo as having the moral status as an adult 
human being would negatively impact the role 
and status of women in our society. 
 
Other SCSG participants did not agree that 
granting embryos full moral status would 
necessarily result in such harsh restrictions or 
extreme expectations.  Society already takes 
affirmative measures to promote fetal health and 
prenatal care.  Women who know they are 
pregnant—if they want the child—usually do 
change their behaviors to protect their fetuses.  
Society has been known to go as far as putting a 
drug-addicted pregnant woman in jail to prevent 
her from harming her fetus.  Furthermore, some 
women do mourn embryos lost in early 
spontaneous abortion, provided they knew they 
were pregnant.  And even if the embryo has full 
moral status, it does not necessarily follow that 
we would expect all women of childbearing age 
to alter their behaviors on the chance that they 
might be pregnant.  People are free to engage in 
all sorts of behaviors that they know to have a 
small chance of harming someone unknown to 
them.  The only behaviors that would necessarily 
be forbidden if the embryo were to be granted 
full moral status would be its deliberate harm or 
destruction, as in abortion or the extraction of ES 
cells, and some members of the SCSG did not see 
abstinence from those activities as extraordinary 
burdens. 
 
In the end, the thought experiment elicited the 
same diversity of opinions seen in contemporary 
debates among ethicists, legislators and the 
general public.  To that extent, our deliberations 
certainly supported the impression that the issue 
may well be irresolvable at a metaphysical level.  
At the same time, the SCSG discussions 
confirmed the importance of the moral status of 
the embryo in the current debate about ES cell 
research.  Few issues elicited positions as earnest 
or as deeply felt as the status of the embryo, and 
no other issue commanded as significant a share 
of our discussion time.   
 
The very prevalence of this issue led us to the 
important insight that one does not have to 
ascribe “full moral status” to the embryo to be 
concerned with its treatment.  How we treat the 
embryo reflects (and possibly influences) our 
collective senses of self, personhood, body and 
society.  In this respect, it is similar to other 
defining social practices (e.g., marriage, 
adoption, childrearing, child abuse, commerce in 
organs, commerce in embryos, oocytes and 
sperm, abortion and disposal of the dead), for 
which society has traditionally exercised 
particular care through legislation and regulation.  
Thus, like many other groups considering this 
issue, the SCSG had less difficulty agreeing that 
an embryo deserves some measure of respect 
than determining what that respect entails in 
relation to the treatment of embryos remaining 
after infertility treatments or the creation of 
research-purpose embryos.   
 
C.2.a. Embryos in excess of clinical need following 
infertility treatments 
 
Support for research on ES cells from embryos in 
excess of clinical need following infertility 
treatments often relies on the argument that the 
embryos would otherwise be discarded.  As such, 
the SCSG considered how the moral status of an 
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embryo is or could be affected by the fact that it 
will never be implanted in a woman’s uterus with 
the intention of it becoming a child.  How might 
the destruction of that embryo be different from 
the destruction of an embryo that will be 
implanted?  
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When stem cells are taken from the inner cell 
mass of a blastocyst, the embryo is destroyed, 
and so a life (or potential life) is ended.  In a 
sense, though, the “killing” of an embryo that 
remains after infertility treatments is unlike any 
other kind of killing, inasmuch as there is no loss 
of life that would otherwise have existed.  If the 
embryo were not used for stem cell research, it 
would not develop into a fetus and then a child, 
but would remain frozen until eventually 
discarded.  By contrast, when an adult person is 
killed, a life that would otherwise have continued 
to exist is ended.  Decades of life may have been 
lost.  This is true even for someone who is 
terminally ill.  The individual would have died 
anyway if her life had not been ended 
intentionally, but an indeterminate amount life 
that would otherwise have existed—whether a 
day or a year—has been taken away.  In short, 
one may consider the taking of life to be wrong 
not simply because a life is ended, but because 
life is lost that would otherwise have existed, and 
therefore condone the destruction of frozen 
embryos that remain after infertility treatments.   
 
Some members of the SCSG raised concerns 
about this analysis, however.  To these members 
it seemed problematic to make the value of any 
being conditional on a probability of what will be 
done to it in the future by others.  Not only is 
such a position dangerous (inasmuch as it invites 
all manner of violations of persons who are 
“going to die anyway”), but it also undermines 
any notion that the “moral status” of the embryo 
derives from something inherent in the embryo 
itself as a human life.  If we are to ascribe any 
degree of “moral status” to the embryo on the 
basis of what it is (or even on what it has the 
internal potential to become) then it must inhere 
equally to all embryos, regardless of external 
contingencies.  If one bases an embryo’s value on 
what others plan to do with it, then “moral 
status” becomes nothing more than a measure of 
social utility.   
 
But it would be misleading to characterize the 
discussion within the SCSG as a contrast between 
those who believed that obtaining ES cells from 
embryos remaining after infertility treatment is 
ethically permissible because the “killing” of an 
embryo is acceptable and those who believed that 
this act is not acceptable.  Embryo destruction is 
a consequence of obtaining ES cells from this 
source.  For some members of the SCSG, no 
amount of potential benefit from ES cell research 
would justify this means of obtaining them. For 
others, the degree to which this is ethically 
justifiable depends as much on the purpose and 
intention of the use of the ES cells as on the 
manner of obtaining them.  And for still others, it 
does not seem inconsistent to object to embryo 
destruction while still supporting research on ES 
cells that have already been obtained from this 
source.  This position is very similar to a dilemma 
described by Father Demetrious Demopolous, 
who explained an Eastern Orthodox perspective 
on this issue in testimony before NBAC: 
 
I cannot condone any procedure that 
threatens viability, dignity and sanctity of 
that life. In my view the establishment of 
embryonic stem cell lines…was done at 
the cost of human lives. 
 
When asked how this view applied to the use of 
existing ES cell lines, Father Demopolous replied 
that: 
 
…I wish they had not been derived in the 
way that they were but since they are 
there…I do not think it would be a good 
thing not to take advantage of [their 
availability]. (NBAC 1999b, 54) 
 
As noted below in Section E.1.d., this type of 
argument informed the present policy of the Bush 
administration. 
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All SCSG participants recognized the distinction 
between the use of embryos remaining after 
infertility treatments and the creation of 
“research-purpose” embryos for the purpose of 
obtaining stem cells.  However, opinions varied 
as to the ethical or policy relevance of that 
distinction.  There were some who believed both 
uses to be illicit; some who believed that the use 
of embryos that were destined for destruction 
anyway should be allowed, but not the creation 
of embryos specifically for research purposes; and 
some who could conceive of circumstances under 
which even the creation of embryos for research 
may be justified.   
C.2.b. Embryos created solely for research purposes 
 
Arguments in favor of intentionally creating 
embryos generally rely on two points: first, that 
there may not be an adequate supply of ES cells 
from existing embryos; second, that the scientific 
quality of these embryos may be superior to those 
that are destined to be discarded by IVF clinics.  
Nevertheless, the idea of creating embryos 
specifically for use in research has provoked some 
of the strongest opposition of all the sources of 
ES cells.   
 
Most who oppose the destruction of embryos 
remaining after infertility treatments also oppose 
the intentional creation and destruction of 
“research-purpose” embryos on similar grounds, 
with the additional objection that it further 
“instrumentalizes” human life.  There is also a 
significant group of people who support ES cell 
research using embryos remaining after infertility 
treatments, but who draw the line at the creation 
of research-purpose embryos.  To these 
individuals, the intention of the person who 
created the embryo has critical moral relevance:  
it is one thing to create an embryo for the 
purpose of having a child, which would thus have 
at least a chance of growing to adulthood, and 
later to donate it for research when it no longer 
has that chance; it is quite another thing to create 
an embryo for the express purpose of obtaining 
ES cells, knowing that this procedure will destroy 
the embryo.  This position reflects the same 
moral intuition against instrumentalization – 
using something or someone purely as a means to 
an end.  Even among SCSG members who did 
not believe that frozen embryos have the same 
moral status as adults, many believed that 
intentionally creating an embryo solely to obtain 
ES cells called into question whether any respect 
is accorded to that embryo.  And of course, for 
those members who believed that the frozen 
embryo has little or no moral status, the idea of 
producing embryos to obtain ES cells was not 
morally problematic.   
 
C.3. ES cells and cloning 
 
Our discussion took place against the backdrop of 
federal and state legislative debate on the subject 
of human cloning.  While we did not consider the 
issue of cloning systematically, we did discuss the 
potential benefits and concerns associated with 
the possibility of using of somatic cell nuclear 
transfer (SCNT) technology to create embryos 
for use in stem cell research and therapies.   
 
Unlike human reproductive cloning, the creation 
of embryos by nuclear transplantation for the 
purpose of extracting their stem cells would not 
involve implantation of an embryo in a uterus and 
thus would not produce a fully developed, live-
born person, i.e., a “clone”.  Rather, like 
embryos created by IVF for research (rather than 
reproductive) purposes, embryos created by what 
is commonly called “therapeutic” (rather than 
reproductive) cloning would only be grown to 
the blastocyst stage, at which point ES cells 
would be extracted from the inner cell mass, 
destroying the embryo.   
 
By using stem cells from an embryo created by 
SCNT with the transplant recipient’s own genes, 
scientists could create tissue that the recipient’s 
body would not view as foreign.  This could 
greatly reduce the likelihood that a person’s body 
would reject that tissue and could therefore 
obviate the need for immunosuppressive drugs.  
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It is widely believed that this development could 
revolutionize treatment of such devastating 
diseases as Lou Gehrig’s disease, Parkinson’s 
disease, Alzheimer’s disease, spinal-cord injury, 
cancer, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, 
rheumatoid arthritis, and many others.   
 
Given these considerations, some members of the 
SCSG expressed concern that legislative action 
undertaken to ban human reproductive cloning 
should not extend to the use of nuclear 
transplantation to produce embryos for stem cell 
research and therapy.  These members held that 
it is not cloning technology in itself that is 
unethical, but rather the use of such technology 
for procreative purposes.  The use of nuclear 
transplantation in stem cell research and, 
ultimately, regenerative medical therapies could 
potentially save millions of lives and relieve the 
suffering of countless others, and many people 
therefore believed that it should be permitted.  
Not surprisingly, this group did not include those 
members of the SCSG who objected to the 
destruction of embryos for ES cell research.   
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D. Theology and Stem Cell Research 
 
As noted above, ES cell research raises 
fundamental questions about the moral status of 
incipient human life, answers to which vary 
widely and depend largely on one’s metaphysical 
presuppositions.  For many people, such beliefs 
are rooted in the teachings of a particular 
theological tradition. In light of the profound 
influence that religious traditions have had and 
continue to have on ethics and public policy 
discourse about this and other issues, the SCSG 
devoted one of its meetings to presentations and 
discussion of two theological perspectives.   
 
Certainly, no single religious point of view exists 
on the issue of human stem cell research.  Indeed, 
not only is there considerable diversity among 
faith traditions about some of the issues associated 
with stem cell research, but there is also 
disagreement within individual faith traditions on 
many of these issues (NBAC 2000).  The SCSG 
heard presentations from a Roman Catholic priest 
and a congregational Jewish rabbi.  The selection 
of these perspectives was determined by the 
availability of speakers and the interests of SCSG 
members.  Other important faith traditions have 
strongly held views about stem cell research, and 
while the SCSG schedule did not permit 
presentations of all of these perspectives, we 
suspect that they would similarly have enriched 
the discussion (as would additional legal, ethical, 
or scientific commentaries).    
 
Both the Jewish and Catholic traditions work 
from stable Biblical and theological points of 
view.  Both traditions have clear orthodox 
perspectives, which they offer within the public 
arena.  Both traditions seek clear, reliable, and 
logical propositions to guide behavior (Cahill 
2001, 47-48).  And yet their conclusions, 
prohibitions, and sanctions differ dramatically.  
Thus, these two presentations offered instructive 
similarities and contrasts, provoking reflection on 
method in religious ethics and about the place of 
religious discourse in public policy. 
 
Like other presentations the SCSG heard, the 
descriptions that follow reflect the views of the 
presenters, rather than the group as a whole.  
Still, given that religious claims about the moral 
life are foundational for many cultures, those 
descriptions can only be seen as basic descriptions 
of detailed moral theologies.  The sections that 
follow were written principally (with only 
modest editing for consistency) by Rabbi Dennis 
Sasso and Father Joseph Rautenberg, 
respectively. 
  
D.1. A Jewish perspective 
 
Judaism is a “life-affirming” faith.  The protection 
and improvement of life is a divine imperative 
based on the biblical command:  “Choose life” 
(Deuteronomy 30:19).  The commandments in 
the Torah are given for the purpose that we may 
“live by them” (Leviticus 18:5).  Under all 
circumstances, we are bidden to protect life.  
One may only sacrifice one’s own life under 
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extraordinary circumstances, e.g., if one is forced 
to commit murder, idolatry or sexual immorality 
(Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 74a and Pesahim 
25a-b; Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah, 157:1).   
 
A preeminent Jewish value is to “provide 
healing.” God is often referred to as Rofeh 
“healer” or  “physician” (Daily Amidah, 8th 
blessing). The Jewish morning liturgy begins with 
a blessing of marvel at the human organism and 
gratitude for its creation.  Following this there is 
a prayer of thanksgiving for the soul, which 
animates the body.  Given the importance of 
healing, physicians and health providers are seen 
as partners of God.  This therapeutic orientation 
provides the basis for the Jewish teaching on the 
issue of stem cells. 
 
Any discussion of research involving stem cells 
evokes questions about the beginning of life.  In 
the Talmud and rabbinic writings the embryo and 
fetus are seen as limbs, as extensions of the life of 
the mother (Rosner 1978, 257-259).  While the 
fetus is potential human life and deserving of 
special moral consideration and protection, it is 
not regarded as independent human life; it is a 
part of the body of the mother and has no “legal” 
status of its own.  Thus, in issues such as 
abortion, the presumption is always in favor of 
the mother.  Jewish religious law permits 
abortion whenever the pregnancy poses a threat 
to the physical or, according to some 
interpretations, to the psychological well-being of 
the mother (Feldman 1986, 79-90). 
 
This earliest source of this teaching is found in the 
Torah, in which a different punishment is 
assigned for the killing of a fetus and the murder 
of its mother (Exodus 21:22).  Later, in the 
rabbinic tradition, it was taught that if a woman 
has life-threatening difficulty in childbirth, the 
child should be aborted (Mishna, Oholot 7:6).  
Once its head has emerged, however, it may not 
be harmed.  The Talmud explains that the 
embryo may be seen as a “pursuer”, and one is 
justified in defending one’s life against a pursuer 
[This argument is based on two scriptural 
passages: Deuteronomy 25:11-12 and Leviticus 
19:16.  See Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Hilchot 
Rotzeach Ush’mirat Hanefesh, ch. 2, par. 6; 
Karo, Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat, ch. 425, 
par. 2]. 
 
While the Talmud briefly discusses the issue of 
ensoulment, it dismisses it as ultimately 
unanswerable (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 
110b).  According to accepted Jewish teaching, 
the soul enters at birth, and this matter is 
irrelevant to the question of abortion, since the 
life and health of the mother are the issues at 
stake.   
 
The issue of stem cells is different from the issue 
of abortion, inasmuch as the embryo is not 
developing in the womb.  According to Jewish 
tradition, “genetic material” outside the womb 
has no legal status.  Even within the womb, up 
until forty days, it is considered to be the 
equivalent of water (Dorff 2000, C-4).   
 
In addition to its “pronatalist” stance, Judaism 
sees technology as neutral.  Technology is not 
good or bad in itself; what matters is how you use 
it (Dorff 2002, 31).  There is no “natural law” in 
Judaism.  Jews neither worship nor degrade 
nature.  God created the world incomplete, with 
much left to be done.  As partners of God, 
humans are the appropriate actors in the 
completion of creation.  Accordingly, even 
Orthodox Jewish leaders have endorsed 
therapeutic cloning as a means of obtaining stem 
cells for research and medical therapy 
(Cooperman 2002, A04).   
 
D.2. A Catholic perspective 
 
The Catholic Church teaches that it is not licit to 
produce or destroy human embryos for the 
cultivation of human stem cells and it is not licit 
to use such stem cells provided by other 
researchers (Pontifical Academy for Life 2000).  
This teaching is rooted in beliefs about who or 
what the embryo is (ontological status), what 
obligations are owed to that being (moral status), 
12 
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and how one ought to behave in situations of 
uncertainty (epistemology).   
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In syngamy, the sperm and oocyte unite to 
become a new human organism, genetically 
distinct from either of its parents.  The zygote 
(and later the embryo) is an individual human 
being with its own internal dynamic, its own end.  
It is an actual human life in the process of 
development, not a being that might someday 
“become” a human life.  This new human being 
has its own ontological status.  It depends on its 
mother, but is not “part of her”:  “the living 
human embryo is – from the moment of the 
union of the gametes – a human subject with a 
well-defined identity, which from that point 
begins its own coordinated, continuous and gradual 
development, such that at no later stage can it be 
considered as a simple mass of cells” (Pontifical 
Academy for Life 2000, emphasis in original).   
 
A “developmental” view holds that the embryo 
does not start out fully ‘personal’ but becomes 
more and more a person as it goes through 
certain developmental stages approaching birth.  
This seems to be an intermediate or compromise 
position that reflects abortion law in the United 
States.  Such a view is held by some moralists 
within the Catholic Church (Shannon and Wolter 
1990).  The problem a developmental view has is 
in identifying any equally significant watershed 
point after conception after which the being 
could be said to have become a “person.”  Before 
conception, there exist two ‘things’:  the 
mother’s egg and the father’s sperm.  After 
conception, there exists a new human being, 
developing according to its own unique interior 
principles.  In the process of that being’s 
development, there is no comparable point of 
physical change on which to hang such a 
significant ontological distinction.  Moreover, by 
hinging “personhood” on certain characteristics or 
faculties that appear at some point in the 
development of the new being, the 
developmental view raises questions about the 
“personhood” of adult (or child) human beings 
who lack or lose such “critical characteristics” 
(e.g. those who are in a permanent vegetative 
state or profoundly mentally disabled, etc).   
 
Ontological and moral status are linked.  Who or 
what the embryo is physically is linked to who or 
what it is morally, and what obligations we have 
to it.  This is an intrinsic, not an extrinsic, link.  
Thus, the embryo’s ontological status as a human 
individual entails full moral status as a human 
person:  “From this it follows that as a “human 
individual” it has the right to its own life; and 
therefore any intervention which is not in favor of 
the embryo is an act which violates that right…” 
(Pontifical Academy for Life 2000).  There is an 
intrinsic sacredness and dignity in the human 
person – at all stages of its development – that is 
not dependent on any social or legal ascription of 
“respect,” even by her or his mother.  As such, no 
individual life (including embryonic) may ever be 
sacrificed by another for the greater good of 
society (scientific progress toward the treatment 
of disease).  Our society purports to treat all 
human beings as fundamentally equal in dignity 
and under the law.  This status is ascribed all at 
once and independent of rational function, or any 
other qualitative criterion.  The Catholic Church 
sees no basis for the exclusion of the embryo 
from this full human dignity and equality.   
 
The Catholic Church recognizes that human 
beings have moral obligations to heal and to 
rescue others, and that the moral difference 
between action and omission can be slippery and 
variable.  Nevertheless, it is generally accepted 
that a morally significant difference exists 
between (1) killing an individual human being 
intentionally and in a causally immediate way, 
and (2) allowing a human being who is 
causally/physically remote from us to die.  For 
example, most people would recognize a moral 
difference between intentionally killing another 
and declining to make an additional contribution 
to charity, even if it is theoretically foreseeable 
that the latter act would result in increased loss of 
life somewhere in the world.  Similarly, a 
researcher’s obligation to refrain from directly 
killing human beings for stem cell research should 
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prevail over his or her responsibility to pursue 
one particular means possibly to rescue people 
through such research.  Our moral, existential, 
character-forming responsibility for the killing of 
embryos for their stem cells determines our 
decision not to help in this way.  This is not a 
rejection of the value and dignity of human 
persons, but a rejection of one particular means of 
responding to that value, while affirming and 
pursuing other means. The destruction of the 
embryo associated with harvesting stem cells is, 
by contrast, an inevitable devaluing of the human 
being ‘harvested.’ 
 
How can the Catholic Church claim to “know” 
the ontological or moral status of the embryo?  
Beyond the biological facts, Catholic Christianity, 
like Judaism and all other religious and moral 
traditions, relies on fundamental intuitions, 
vision, stories and narrative (“You formed my 
inmost being; you knit me in my mother’s 
womb” -- Psalm 139:13).  This is one reason that 
the debate in the public arena may well be 
“interminable” (MacIntyre 1981, 6).  We may 
have fundamentally different stories or “forms of 
life.”  In the public sphere, the more relevant 
determination may well be how we ought to act 
in a situation of uncertainty or of irreconcilable 
disagreement.  While Catholicism, like Judaism 
and other traditions, affirms the role of human 
beings as co-Creators and consequently embraces 
the use of technology in service of human 
persons, the Catholic Church also acknowledges 
that human ingenuity can overreach its 
appropriate boundaries.  An innovation that 
seems promising in the immediate future can 
have unanticipated destructive effects in the long 
run.  Given the uncertainty about the risks of this 
research and the disagreement about its morality, 
the Catholic Church has urged policy-makers to 
“err on the side of life.”  If it cannot be shown 
that the embryo is not a human person, then we 
ought to treat it with the respect owed to a full 
member of the human community.  The risks of 
not doing so—the potential for widespread 
destruction of human lives and the moral 
degradation of a society that so disvalues human 
life—are simply too great. 
 
These individual harms and societal risks become 
even less acceptable when one considers that the 
medical benefits promised from embryonic stem 
cells may also be available through adult stem cell 
research.  Why risk possible harm to human 
persons if this may be unnecessary?  It may be 
argued that it would be quicker to do both 
embryonic and adult stem cell research, and that 
lives may be lost or damaged in the time spent 
establishing what, if any, are the limits of adult 
stem cells as compared with embryonic.  
However, it may be equally possible that progress 
toward useful therapies would, in fact, be more 
rapid if we did not divide our efforts but focused 
on the more generally morally acceptable 
research on adult stem cells, at least until this is 
shown to be unsatisfactory. 
 
The preceding sections on “Selected Ethical 
Issues” and “Theology and Stem Cell Research” 
reflect and illustrate the level of discussion we 
had about a number of challenging moral issues.  
These conversations were exhaustive but not 
comprehensive:  some issues (such as ‘moral 
status’) occupied a considerable amount of our 
time, while others received less attention.  Both 
approaches helpfully informed the SCSG.   
 
E. Law and Policy Related to Stem Cell 
Research 
 
E.1. What does the law say? 
 
E.1.a. EG cells from cadaveric fetal tissue 
 
Obtaining stem cells from aborted fetuses is 
permitted under federal regulations for the 
protection of human subjects in research, 
specifically 45 CFR 46.206:  “Research 
involving…cells, tissue, or organs excised from a 
dead fetus, shall be conducted only in accord with 
any applicable Federal, State, or local laws and 
regulations regarding such activities.”  The 
regulation adds procedural safeguards to separate 
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the decision to donate tissue from the decision to 
abort:  
 
“(h) No inducements, monetary or 
otherwise, [can] be offered to terminate a 
pregnancy; (i) Individuals engaged in the 
research [may] have no part in any 
decisions as to the timing, method, or 
procedures used to terminate a 
pregnancy; and (k) Individuals engaged in 
the research [may] have no part in 
determining the viability of a neonate.” 
(45 CFR 46.204) 
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Within these parameters, state laws vary.  Some 
states prohibit all research on aborted fetuses 
and/or the tissue of aborted fetuses (e.g., Indiana 
[Ind. Code § 16-34-2-6 (2002)], Arizona [Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 36-2302 (2001)]), while others 
prohibit research on aborted fetuses only if the 
woman’s consent is not obtained (e.g., 
Massachusetts [Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112, § 
12J(a)(II) (2002)], Tennessee [Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 39-15-208(a) (2001)]).  About half the states do 
not address the issue at all.  In the absence of a 
statute prohibiting fetal research, it is permitted. 
 
Federal law not only permits fetal tissue research 
and transplantation, it also funds therapeutic uses 
of fetal tissue.  The NIH Revitalization Act of 
1993 permits federal funding for the 
“transplantation of human fetal tissue for 
therapeutic purposes,” as long as a number of 
conditions are satisfied (e.g., practices are 
consistent with state law, woman’s decision to 
abort is made before tissue donation is requested, 
method or timing of abortion not affected by 
decision to donate tissue) (42 USC §289g-1). 
 
E.1.b. ES cells from human embryos  
 
Though no federal laws address the use of 
embryos ex utero in research, some states do 
prohibit use of embryonic stem cells for research 
and/or transplantation.  Louisiana requires that 
embryos be used only for implantation to have a 
child [La. Rev. Stat. 9:122 (2002)]; Arizona bans 
experiments with any embryo or parts of an 
embryo [Ariz. Rev. Stat. §36-2302(A) (2001)]; 
and several states (including Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island) ban research on a live embryo 
“before or after expulsion from its mother’s 
womb” [Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112, §12J(A)(I) 
(2002); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-54-1(b) (2001)].  
(There is some debate about the applicability of 
these laws to embryos that were never intended 
to be transferred to a mother’s womb.) 
 
There is also a body of state law governing the 
sale of human embryos, which may apply to the 
sale of stem cell lines derived from human 
embryos.  Some states prohibit sales of embryos 
for any purpose (e.g., Louisiana [La. Rev. Stat. 
9:122 (2002)]); some prohibit the sale of 
embryos for research purposes (e.g., North 
Dakota [N.D. Cent. Code, § 14-02.2-02 (2002)], 
South Dakota [S.D. Codified Laws § 34-14-17 
(2001)]); and still others prohibit the sale of 
embryos for any purpose, but permit the sale of 
cell lines derived from nonliving embryos (e.g., 
Minnesota [Minn. Stat. § 145.422 (2001)]). 
 
E.1.c. The Clinton administration policy 
 
Federal policy toward the facilitation of 
embryonic stem cell research has been much 
more explicit.  For the past eight years, annual 
riders in appropriations bills funding the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) have prohibited use of 
federal funds for the creation of human embryos 
for research purposes or for research in which 
human embryos are destroyed (Passeggio 2002, 
347-349).  Under the Clinton administration, 
these prohibitions were interpreted in such a way 
that federal research support could be provided 
to researchers to use ES cells, but this support 
could not be provided to researchers to derive ES 
cells from embryos.  Derivation—obtaining and 
culturing ES cells from the inner cell mass of the 
blastocyst—destroys the embryo and would 
therefore violate the prohibition on the use of 
federal funds as defined in the riders.  
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This interpretation, provided by the Office of the 
General Counsel of the Department of Health 
and Human Services was based on the argument 
that an ES cell is not itself an embryo (Kukla 
2002, 508).  Placed into a uterus, a single stem 
cell could not develop into an adult human being.  
The legal opinion did not apply to privately 
funded researchers, who were still free to 
develop embryos and obtain ES cells from them 
(Kukla 2002, 509).   It was on this basis that the 
National Institutes of Health developed a 
proposed policy for stem cell research, one that 
would have permitted grantees to use ES cells but 
not to develop these cell lines themselves.  
 
The ethical distinction supporting the policy drew 
criticism from both sides of the issue.  Federal 
funding of ES cell research would create a 
considerable demand for new cell lines, 
opponents argued.  The government would be 
causally complicit in the destruction of embryos 
to meet that demand, whether or not it directly 
funded the destruction.  Meanwhile, proponents 
of ES cell research stressed that the quality of the 
science would be enhanced if the same 
researchers could both collect and study the cells.  
The NIH position, while appearing to take a 
middle road, was seen by some as ethically 
disingenuous, since it would support a 
worthwhile goal (ES cell research) but not the 
means necessary to carry it out (funding the 
derivation).  Implementation of the proposed 
NIH guidelines was put on hold as a result of the 
change from the Clinton to the Bush  
administration. 
 
E.1.d. The Bush administration policy 
 
The change in administrations meant that the 
proposed NIH guidelines remained in policy 
limbo.  On August 9, 2001, President Bush 
described his policy approach.  President Bush’s 
policy would permit federal funding for research 
involving existing stem cell lines (approximately 
sixty) but prohibit federal funding for any 
research involving new stem cell lines, regardless 
of where the destruction of the embryo takes 
place (Kukla 2002, 515).  Specifically, Bush’s 
policy allowed federal funding for existing stem 
cell lines that were derived: (1) with the 
informed consent of the donors; (2) from excess 
embryos created solely for reproductive purposes 
prior to August 9, 2001; and (3) without any 
financial inducements to the donors.  The policy 
denied federal funding for: (1) the derivation or 
use of stem cell lines derived from newly 
destroyed embryos; (2) the creation of any 
human embryos for research purposes; or (3) the 
cloning of human embryos for any purpose (The 
White House 2001). 
 
E.2.  What should the law have to say about using 
stem cells in research and treatment? 
 
While it is frequently argued that the government 
should not “legislate morality,” the reality is that 
laws should – and generally do – follow ethical 
understanding.  Society constantly creates laws to 
reflect and enforce collective moral norms.  It is a 
commonplace assumption in our own society that 
if something is morally unacceptable (murder, 
battery, theft), then the law should outlaw it.  (It 
is worthy of note that this parallelism between 
social mores and law is less true of positive moral 
responsibilities than it is of negative rights; we 
are far more likely to support a legal prohibition 
of murder than to pass a law requiring citizens to 
save a life whenever possible.)  Thus, if it is 
morally impermissible to use stem cells, it 
probably should be legally impermissible to do 
so. 
 
Another common objection to legal regulation of 
the use of stem cells is that the government 
should not interfere with scientific inquiry.  The 
content of our discussions revealed that even if 
one believes that the creation of “research-
purpose embryos” ought to be permissible, one 
must nevertheless admit that this is more than a 
simple question of research freedom.  As one 
SCSG speaker put it, the treatment of embryos is 
a defining social practice, such as marriage, 
adoption, childrearing, child abuse, abortion and 
disposal of the dead.  We do not consider it to be 
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inappropriate to be concerned as a polity 
(through our government) about the nature of 
our society as it is reflected in these practices, 
and neither should we disregard the implications 
of embryonic stem cell research.   
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E.2.a. Distinction between “permitting” and 
“facilitating” 
 
When the government permits a practice – and 
particularly when that practice is ethically 
controversial – it may still choose not to 
materially support that practice.  Here again, 
there is a clear preference for “negative” rights 
over their “positive” counterparts.  In the United 
States, a woman may have a legal negative right 
to have an abortion, but she does not have a 
concomitant positive right to be assisted in that 
endeavor by the government.  This distinction is 
the basis for President Bush’s policy to withhold 
federal funding for obtaining stem cells, while 
allowing such research to continue in the private 
sector.  
  
Often, the distinction between permitting and 
facilitating reflects considerations of federalism 
(i.e., the balance of authority between state 
governments and the national government).  
Every state government enjoys a broad “police 
power” to regulate for the benefit of public safety 
and welfare.  When the original thirteen colonies 
agreed to yield some of their sovereignty and 
become states in the United States of America, 
they made the national government one of 
limited powers.  Congress does not have a broad 
police power to protect public safety and 
welfare.  Rather, it can enact laws only in 
accordance with the powers that are enumerated 
to it in the United States Constitution.  Thus, 
while state governments have clear authority to 
ban stem cell research, the national government 
might not have such authority.  The Constitution 
does not specifically authorize Congress to 
regulate in the area of health, so Congress has to 
justify its regulation of medical research and 
practice as a way to advance one of its other 
powers (e.g., its authority to regulate interstate 
commerce).  Because the powers of Congress are 
limited, its only recourse to certain activities may 
be to withhold funding from them.    
 
In addition to withholding funding to discourage 
a permitted activity, Congress can also discourage 
the activity by linking funding for other projects 
to the recipient’s willingness to refrain from the 
activity in question.  For example, although 
Congress cannot prohibit physicians from 
discussing the option of abortion with pregnant 
women, it can withhold funding from clinics 
whose physicians discuss abortions with the 
patients.  Thus, Congress could prohibit 
recipients of Medicare or Medicaid funds from 
engaging in stem cell research. 
 
Although the exact avenue of federal regulation 
may be uncertain, a majority of our group 
concluded that any regulation of stem cell 
research should be undertaken at the federal level 
of government and not at the state or local level.  
This conclusion reflected a number of 
considerations, most notably: 
 
(1) Biomedical research and clinical facilities 
in the United States engage in and affect 
interstate and international commerce, 
which under the Constitution are 
regulated by the federal government.  
The services provided by clinical facilities 
move in interstate commerce, and 
patients travel regularly across state lines 
(and international borders) in order to 
access clinical facilities. 
 
(2) Attempting to regulate what is clearly an 
international enterprise on a state-by-
state basis can easily lead to confusion 
and conflict. 
 
To be sure, there are important arguments for 
state regulation.  In particular, when it is unclear 
how regulations should be written—should they 
prohibit stem cell research entirely or should they 
implement guidelines under which stem cell 
research is conducted?—it may be undesirable to 
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settle on a single approach for the entire country.  
States can try different approaches, allowing a 
“laboratory of state experimentation” that allows 
the country to discover by trial and error the 
optimal way to regulate stem cell research. 
 
E.2.b. Deciding about permitting stem cell use 
 
In addition to determining the moral weight to be 
granted the concerns about using stem cells, 
society also needs to decide how to resolve the 
conflict between differing and sometimes 
substantially opposing moral values.  Does the 
moral equation take the form of balancing 
conflicting interests as in abortion?  Under 
Supreme Court doctrine, the woman’s interests 
prevail before viability when the fetus’s interests 
are weaker, and the fetus’s interests prevail after 
viability when those interests are greater.  Instead 
of balancing conflicting interests, society might 
conclude that one interest always has greater 
weight, that it trumps the lesser interest.  The 
“dead donor” rule in organ transplantation 
reflects this hierarchical approach.  Physicians 
cannot take a life-necessary organ (e.g., a heart 
or whole liver) from a person for transplantation 
before the person is dead, even if the person is 
permanently unconscious and has left instructions 
in a living will for the use of the organs for 
transplantation in the event of permanent 
unconsciousness.  A third approach to resolving 
conflicting interests is to identify other interests 
that tip the balance in one direction or another.  
This approach was used by the California 
Supreme Court in resolving a custody dispute in a 
case of gestational surrogacy (i.e., surrogacy in 
which a woman carries the pregnancy but doesn’t 
supply the egg).  The California court gave equal 
weight to the biological mother (the woman who 
supplied the egg) and the gestational mother (the 
woman who carried the pregnancy) but tipped 
the balance in favor of the biological mother 
because it had been the intent of both mothers 
that the biological mother would raise the child. 
 
In addressing such challenges there is a strong 
temptation to draw analogies to abortion law, but 
such parallels are not necessarily decisive.  On 
one hand, society might observe that an embryo 
in an infertility clinic has weaker interests than a 
fetus in a uterus.  The embryo is younger and is 
not going to become a child if left alone.  If a 
woman’s right of self-determination allows her to 
end the life of a fetus in her uterus for no 
particular reason, then it seems to follow that an 
embryo in a laboratory can have its life ended for 
the good purpose of taking the stem cells to treat 
serious and irreversible illness.  A right to 
abortion seems to perforce generate a right to 
take stem cells for therapeutic purposes.  
However, there is another way to apply abortion 
principles to stem cells.  Although the embryo 
has weaker interests than the fetus, the possessor 
of an ex utero embryo has weaker interests than 
does a pregnant woman.  The woman choosing 
abortion can be said to be acting not out of a 
general right of self-determination but out of a 
more particular right to restore her bodily 
integrity.  Just as no parent is obligated to give 
bone marrow to a child for transplantation, so is 
no pregnant woman required to give of her body 
to maintain a fetus (until the fetus can survive 
without her body).  Since an embryo in a 
laboratory invades no one’s bodily integrity, it 
may be harder to justify its destruction than to 
justify the destruction of a fetus.  In short, the 
applicability of the precedent of abortion law 
depends on why one believes abortion should be 
permissible. 
 
F.  Conclusions  
 
Given wide (and seemingly irreconcilable) 
disagreement on a number of fundamental issues, 
the most important question facing policy-makers 
may well be how society ought to respond to 
such a diversity of perspectives.  As we have 
described in the preceding sections, the diversity 
among Stem Cell Study Group members 
mirrored that of the wider public discourse, and 
complete agreement—especially on certain 
fundamental premises—was rarely, if ever, 
achieved.  
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Many in our group concluded that ES cell 
research is ethically permissible under certain 
conditions and that society ought to err in favor 
of its high moral duty to heal those who suffer 
from serious illness.  From these ethical 
conclusions followed legal conclusions shared by 
the same group since it was conceded by all 
group members that the law should permit stem 
cell research to the extent that it is ethically 
permissible.  These members supported ES cell 
research without the constraints of the Bush 
administration policy but under certain 
conditions: 
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(1) The research should be designed to 
develop treatments for serious diseases.  
Developing treatments for serious 
disease is a moral duty that may in some 
cases outweigh society’s duty to treat 
embryos with respect.  However, even if 
our duties to embryos are not equivalent 
to our duties to persons, we should not 
use them as a means to our own ends 
casually. Research that entails the 
destruction of embryos ought to be 
subject to rigorous standards for 
scientific necessity and therapeutic 
potential. 
 
(2) The destruction of new embryos should 
not be undertaken unless the same 
research cannot be conducted using 
existing ES cell lines.  This condition 
follows from the first condition.  Since 
the destruction of embryos is only to be 
undertaken if it is strictly necessary for 
the treatment of serious disease, then 
researchers ought not to destroy 
additional embryos for ES cells if the 
same benefits can be realized from ES 
cells already in laboratories. 
(3) Scientists should be allowed to create 
research-purpose embryos only if 
research cannot be adequately conducted 
on existing ES cell lines or on stem cells 
derived from embryos in excess of 
clinical need following infertility 
treatments.   
 
As to the question of whether the government 
should not only permit stem cell research but also 
promote it through federal funding of research, 
those who considered ES cell research to be 
ethically permissible also believed that the federal 
government should provide funding for research 
on ES cells.  Given the important benefits to be 
realized from the research and the greater ability 
of the government to regulate research it funds 
than to regulate privately funded research, 
federal funding can play an important role in this 
area.  At the same time, those group members 
who considered ES cell research to be ethically 
unacceptable believed that the federal 
government should neither fund such research 
nor even allow it to proceed in the private sector.  
Significantly, all agreed that the ideal policy 
would be one that is rooted in the ethical 
acceptability or unacceptability of the research 
itself, and would therefore apply consistently to 
both the public and private sectors.   
 
Most of all, in the implementation of these or any 
other policies related to stem cell research or 
other similarly divisive issues, the SCSG urges 
policy makers to be constantly mindful and 
respectful of the diversity of earnest and well-
considered positions that can and should inform 
public policy.  In this regard we agreed with 
NBAC that, “if it is possible to achieve essentially 
the same legitimate public goals with a policy that 
does not offend some citizens’ sincere moral 
sensibilities, it would be better to do so” (NBAC 
1999b, 57). 
 
Listening to diverse perspectives 
 
The SCSG experienced what many thoughtful 
groups before us have found: that coming to 
agreement on many of the issues related to 
human stem cell research is difficult.  Part of the 
difficulty lies in competing views of what 
constitutes the greater moral good.  This applies 
both to those whose beliefs derive from one of 
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the many faith traditions and to those whose 
views have more secular foundations.  It also 
applies to those who hold differing views about 
the role that the law should play in such matters.    
It is in the pursuit of these important goals that 
we offer our efforts as one possible model for 
informed public discussion.  Although the content 
of our discussion was always compelling, it 
sometimes seemed that the process was the more 
important aspect of the Stem Cell Study Group.  
Together, we skirted and then directly 
confronted difficult and seemingly irreconcilable 
perspectives.  Yet the discussion remained a civil 
and respectful discourse among persons of 
conscience.  As a group we modeled a process in 
which non-dominant voices and perspectives 
could be heard by mutually respectful colleagues, 
mindful of the values that we did share, and 
committed to the further exploration (together) 
of the duties and possibilities of public policy 
related to stem cell research.  The “respected 
dissenters” helped to illuminate the boundaries, 
inconsistencies and possibilities of the more 
dominant positions.  In the end, while we were 
not able to resolve all moral questions related to 
stem cell research (and we acknowledged that 
lack of resolution), we did come to a deeper 
understanding of the value of listening to diverse 
perspectives.  
 
Like the SCSG, society as a whole may never 
reach consensus on the issue of stem cell 
research.  The two recent national bioethics 
commissions found that unanimity was difficult to 
achieve on issues of this kind (NBAC 1997, 
1999b; PCB 2002).  Indeed, the search for 
universally acceptable, overriding criteria for 
judging public policy is likely to be disappointing.  
But perhaps unanimity is the wrong goal—and 
even though consensus will always be a fleeting 
and weak form of agreement, it does have certain 
advantages: agreeing to disagree, agreeing to 
respect the views of others, and agreeing to learn 
from diversity are every bit as valuable for 
informing public policy as finding final and 
unanimous agreement.  On many issues—
perhaps stem cell research among them—it 
seems that the traditional strategies for effecting 
resolution have proven inadequate, and there 
remains a pressing need for alternative ways of 
conceiving of and reconciling competing visions 
of the common good.  Our limited exposure to 
the issues involved in stem cell research 
convinced us of the continuing resonance of 
political scientist Robert Dahl’s classic insight:  
  
There is, then, an indispensable need in 
political analysis for the informed 
imagination; for speculation, guided by 
knowledge, that transcends the received 
truths; for the design and contemplation 
of Utopias; for a willingness to think hard 
about unthinkable alternatives to all the 
too easily thinkable solutions. There is, 
in short, a need for a creative search 
inspired by the hunch that somewhere 
between the unattainable best and the 
kind of mediocrity so often attained in 
political matters there lies a universe of 
better alternatives—and worse ones, 
too—all waiting to be explored. (Dahl 
1976, 147) 
20 
 References 
 
American Association for the Advancement of 
Science and Institute for Civil Society 
(AAAS/ICS). 1999. Stem Cell Research and 
Applications: Monitoring the Frontiers of 
Biomedical Research. November. Available 
from 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/ste
m/report.pdf. 
Holden, C and G Vogel. 2002. Plasticity: time 
for a reappraisal? Science 296:2126-2129. 
 
Howell, JC, MC Yoder and EF Srour. 2002. 
Hematopoietic potential of murine skeletal 
muscle-derived CD45-Sca-1+c-kit- cells. Exp 
Hematol 30:915-924. 
 
 Institute of Medicine (IOM). 2002. Stem Cells and 
the Future of Regenerative Medicine. 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Available from:  
American Journal of Bioethics (AJOB). 2002. 
Special Issue: Stem Cells.  Vol. 2, No.1. 
 
Blau HM, TR Brazelton and JM Weimann. 2001. 
The evolving concept of a stem cell: entity or 
function? Cell 105:829-841. 
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309076307/
html/. 
 
Jiang, Y, BN Jahagirdar, RL Reinhardt, et al. 
2002. Pluripotency of mesenchymal stem 
cells derived from adult marrow. Nature 
418:41-49. 
 
Burtchaell, JT. 1988. University policy on 
experimental use of aborted fetal tissue. IRB 
10(4)7-11. 
  
Kukla, HJ. 2002. Embryonic stem cell research: 
an ethical justification. Georgetown Law J 
90:503-543. 
Cahill, LS. 2001. Religion and theology. In 
Sugarman J and D Sulmasy, Methods in Medical 
Ethics. Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press: 47-69.  
Lanza, RP, AL Caplan, LM Silver, et al. 2000. 
The ethical validity of using nuclear transfer 
in human transplantation. JAMA 284:3175-
3179. 
 
Cooperman, A. 2002. Two Jewish groups back 
therapeutic cloning: Orthodox leaders break 
with right. Washington Post, March 13, A4. 
  
Lindblom, C and E Woodhouse. 1993. The 
Policy-Making Process. 3rd ed. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc.. 
Dahl, RA. 1976. Modern Political Analysis. 3rd ed. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
 Dorff, EN. 2002. Embryonic stem cell research: 
the Jewish perspective. The United Synagogue 
Review (Spring):29-33. 
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
  
Moreno, JM, AL Caplan, PR Wolpe, et al. 1998. 
Updating protections for human subjects 
involved in research. JAMA 280:1951-1958. 
———. 2000. Stem cell research. In NBAC, 
Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research, 
Volume III: Religious Perspectives. Rockville, 
MD. C3-C5. Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(NBAC). 1997. Cloning Human Beings. 
Rockville, MD. June. Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
Feldman, DM. 1986. Health and Medicine in the 
Jewish Tradition. New York: Crossroad. 
21 
 ———. 1999a. Research Involving Human 
Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy 
Guidance. Rockville, MD. August.  Available 
from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
———. 1999b. Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell 
Research. Rockville, MD. September. 
Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
———. 2000. Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell 
Research, Volume III: Religious Perspectives. 
Rockville, MD. June. Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
National Institutes of Health (NIH). 2001. Stem 
Cells: Scientific Progress and Future Research 
Directions. Bethesda, MD. June. Available 
from 
http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/scirep
ort.htm. 
 
New York State Task Force on Life and the Law. 
1998. Assisted Reproductive Technologies: 
Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy. 
New York, NY. April.   
 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCB). 2001. Stem 
cell therapy: the ethical issues [Discussion 
Paper]. London. November 14. Available 
from 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/publicati
ons/pp_0000000007.asp. 
 
Orkin, SH. 2000. Stem cell alchemy. Nat Med 
6(11):1212-1213. 
 
Passeggio, ER. 2002. Embryonic stem cell 
research: shifting availability of federal funds. 
Boston University Journal of Science & Technology 
Law 8:347-352. 
 
Pontifical Academy for Life. 2000. Declaration on 
the Production and the Scientific and Therapeutic 
Use of Human Embryonic Stem Cells. August 25. 
Available from 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontif
ical_academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pa_ac
dlife_doc_20000824_cellule-
staminali_en.html. 
 
President's Council on Bioethics (PCB). 2002. 
Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical 
Inquiry [Pre-Publication Version]. 
Washington, DC. July. Available from 
http://www.bioethics.gov/cloningreport. 
 
Rosner, F. 1978. The Jewish attitude toward 
abortion. In Kellner M, Contemporary Jewish 
Ethics. New York: Sanhedrin Press. 257-269. 
 
Shamblott, MJ, J Axelman, S Wang, et al. 1998. 
Derivation of pluripotent stem cells from 
cultured human primordial germ cells. Proc 
Natl Acad Sci USA 95:13726-13731. 
 
Shannon, TA and AB Wolter. 1990. Reflections 
on the moral status of the pre-embryo. 
Theological Studies 51:603-626. 
 
Singer, PA, E Ambrosio, S Birenbaum, et al. 
1992. Advance directives: are they an 
advance? Canadian Medical Association Journal 
146:127-134. 
 
Thomson, JA, J Itskovitz-Elder, SS Shapiro, et al. 
1998. Embryonic stem cell lines derived 
from human blastocysts. Science 282:1145-
1147. 
 
University of Illinois at Chicago Research Ethics 
Study Group. 2002. “Doing it right – 
together”: study groups & research agendas. 
IRB: Ethics & Human Research. 24(1):9-10. 
 
The White House. 2001. Fact Sheet: Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research [Press Release]. August 9. 
Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases
/2001/08/20010809-1.html.
22 
 Members of the Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
Stem Cell Study Group (SCSG) 
 
Approximately forty individuals participated in meetings of the Stem Cell Study Group. 
The following is a list of only those participants who contributed substantively to the authorship of this paper. 
 
 
 
Marti Baker, R.N., J.D. 
Indianapolis 
 
Hal E. Broxmeyer, Ph.D. 
Indiana University School of Medicine 
 
Linda L. Chezem, J.D. 
Indiana University School of Medicine 
 
Cornelis de Waal, Ph.D. 
IUPUI Department of Philosophy 
 
Margaret M. Gaffney, M.D. 
Indiana University School of Medicine 
 
Steven Ivy, M.Div., Ph.D. 
Clarian Health Partners 
 
Joanne Martin, Dr.P.H., M.S., R.N. 
Indiana University School of Nursing 
 
Sarah E. Martin, M.A. 
Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
 
Bruce B. Melchert 
Clarian Health Partners 
 
Eric M. Meslin, Ph.D. 
Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
 
David Orentlicher, M.D., J.D. 
Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
 
Kimberly A. Quaid, Ph.D. 
Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
 
Fr. Joseph F. Rautenberg, M.Div., Ph.D. 
St. Vincent Hospitals and Health Services 
 
Rabbi Dennis C. Sasso, D.Min., D.D. 
Congregation Beth-El Zedeck 
 
William H. Schneider, Ph.D. 
Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
 
Kathleen A. Smith, M.A. 
Indiana University 
 
Mervin C. Yoder, M.D. 
Indiana University School of Medicine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This manuscript is the work of the members of the Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
Stem Cell Study Group.  The opinions expressed are those of individual members of the Stem Cell Study 
Group; however, not every member agrees with every opinion, conclusion or recommendation. 
Neither does the paper represent the views of the Indiana University Center for Bioethics, of Indiana 
University, or of any group represented by the membership. 
23 
 Appendix A:  Speaker Schedule 
 
30 January 2002 The Science of Stem Cells 
 
   Mervin C. Yoder, M.D. 
Professor of Pediatrics, Biochemistry and Molecular Biology 
Indiana University School of Medicine 
 
13 February 2002 Clinical Applications of Stem Cell Research 
    
Hal E. Broxmeyer, Ph.D. 
   Chairman and Mary Margaret Walther Professor of  
Microbiology/Immunology 
Professor of Medicine 
Scientific Director, Walther Oncology Center 
Indiana University School of Medicine 
 
6 March 2002  Legal Issues Related to Stem Cell Research 
     
David Orentlicher, M.D., J.D. 
Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law 
Co-Director, Center for Law and Health 
Indiana University School of Law – Indianapolis 
Core Faculty, Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
 
10 April 2002    Stem Cell Research:  Ethical and Policy Issues 
 
   Eric M. Meslin, Ph.D. 
   Director, Indiana University Center for Bioethics 
Professor of Medicine, Medical and Molecular Genetics  
Indiana University School of Medicine 
Professor of Philosophy 
Indiana University School of Liberal Arts 
 
16 April 2002  Theological Perspectives on Stem Cell Research 
     
Fr. Joe Rautenberg, Ph.D. 
   Ethicist, St. Vincent Hospital 
 
   Rabbi Dennis C. Sasso, D.Min., D.D. 
   Congregation Beth-El Zedeck 
 
15 May 2002  Stem Cell Research in the Public and Private Sectors 
    
Steven H. Holtzman 
President and CEO, Infinity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Commissioner, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 1996-2000 
24 
 25 
Appendix B:  Background Reading 
 
 
Scientific Issues:  
 
National Institutes of Health (NIH). 2001. Stem 
Cells: Scientific Progress and Future Research 
Directions [Executive Summary]. Bethesda, 
MD. June. Available from 
http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/scirep
ort.htm. 
  
Institute of Medicine (IOM). 2002. Stem Cells and 
the Future of Regenerative Medicine. 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Available from 
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309076307/
html/. 
 
Thomas, ED and R Storb. 1999. The 
development of the scientific foundation of 
hematopoietic cell transplantation based on 
animal and human studies. In Thomas, ED, 
KG Blume and SJ Forman, Hematopoietic Cell 
Transplantation. Oxford: Blackwell Science, 
Inc. 1-11. 
 
Broxmeyer, HE and FO Smith. 1999. Cord 
blood stem cell transplantation. In Thomas, 
ED, KG Blume and SJ Forman, Hematopoietic 
Cell Transplantation. Oxford: Blackwell 
Science, Inc. 431-443. 
 
Körbling M. 1999. Peripheral blood stem cells 
for allogeneic transplantation. In Thomas, 
ED, KG Blume and SJ Forman, Hematopoietic 
Cell Transplantation. Oxford: Blackwell 
Science, Inc. 469-480. 
 
 
 
 
Legal Issues:   
 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(NBAC). 1999. Chapter 3: The legal 
framework for federal support of research to 
obtain and use stem cells. In NBAC, Ethical 
Issues in Human Stem Cell Research. Rockville, 
MD. September. 29-44. Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
 
 
 
Ethical Issues:   
 
NBAC. 1999. Chapter 4: Ethical issues in human 
stem cell research. In NBAC, Ethical Issues in 
Human Stem Cell Research. Rockville, MD. 
September. 45-63. Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
Fletcher, JC. 2000. Deliberating incrementally 
on human pluripotent stem cell research. In 
NBAC, Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research, 
Volume II: Commissioned Papers. Rockville, 
MD. January. E1–E50. Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
Parens, E. 2000. What has the president asked of 
NBAC? On the ethics and politics of 
embryonic stem cell research. In NBAC, 
Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research, Volume II: 
Commissioned Papers. Rockville, MD. January. 
I1–I12. Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
Siegel, A. 2000. Ethics, public policy and human 
stem cell research. In NBAC, Ethical Issues in 
Stem Cell Research, Volume II: Commissioned 
Papers. Rockville, MD. January. J1–J11. 
Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
 
 26 
Theological Issues:   
 
Pontifical Academy for Life. 2000. Declaration on 
the Production and the Scientific and Therapeutic 
Use of Human Embryonic Stem Cells. August 25. 
Available from 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontif
ical_academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pa_ac
dlife_doc_20000824_cellule-
staminali_en.html. 
 
Woodward, KL. 2001. A question of life or 
death: untangling the knottiest of ethical 
dilemmas. Newsweek. July 9.  
 
The National Catholic Bioethics Center. 2000. 
Response to the draft National Institutes of 
Health guidelines for research involving 
human pluripotent stem cells (December 
1999). Ethics and Medics 25(3). 
 
Dorff, EN. 2002. Embryonic stem cell research: 
the Jewish perspective. The United Synagogue 
Review (Spring):29-33. 
 
Cohen, CB. 2000. Open possibilities, close 
concerns: the import of religious views on 
the future of stem cell research. The Park 
Ridge Center Bulletin 13 (January).  
 
Religious Views on Stem Cell Research 
[television interview with Lisa Sowle Cahill 
and Sondra Wheeler]. Religion and Ethics 
Newsweekly.  Available from  
http://www.thirteen.org/religionandethics
/week448/perspectives.html. 
 
Hefner, P. 2000. The destiny and danger of being 
human. Zygon  (October). Available from 
http://zygoncenter.org/hefnercloning2.htm 
 
NBAC. 2000. Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell 
Research, Volume III: Religious Perspectives. 
Rockville, MD. June. Available from 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrc
bl/nbac/pubs.html. 
 
Porter, J. 2002. Is the embryo a person? 
Commonweal (February 8). 
 
Harvey, JC. 2002. Distinctly human: the when, 
where & how of life's beginnings. 
Commonweal (February 8).  
 
 
 
 
Miscellaneous: 
 
Cibelli, JB, KA Grant, KB Chapman, et al. 2002. 
Parthenogenetic stem cells in nonhuman 
primates. Science 295:819. 
 
Guterman, L. 2002. Scientists announce advances 
in research on adult and embryonic stem 
cells.  The Chronicle of Higher Education (June 
21). 
 
Kolata, G. 2002. Hybrid embryo mixture may 
offer new source of stem cells for study. The 
New York Times, June 4, D3. 
 
Leggett, K. 2002. Fertile ground: as West mulls 
ethics, China forges ahead in stem-cell 
research. The Wall Street Journal, 6 March. 
 
McGee, G. 2002. Congress needs Biotech 101. 
February 15. Available from 
http://www.msnbc.com/modules/exports
/ct_email.asp?/news/708379.asp. 
 
Safire, W. 2002. On language: slippery slope. 
The New York Times Magazine, April 7, 24. 
 
Wade, N. 2002. New stem cell source called 
possible. The New York Times, February 1. 
 
